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COMBATING THOSE UGLY MEDICAL ERRORS - IT'S TIME
FOR A HOSPITAL REGULATORY MAKEOVER!
JOHN

D. BLUM

"The good government employs peaceful means of regulation"
Lao Tzu
I. INTRODUCTION
By and large the portrait of American health care in the early 21 " century is
one that captures an image of a system characterized by contrasts and
contradictions. On one side of the picture, American health care is represented
by an image depicting extensive and impressive technological capabilities where,
for example, a procedure such as a coronary artery bypass is seen as routine.'
While on the other side of the same portrait, health care presents an enterprise
in crisis, reeling from ongoing challenges, and always desperately in search of
solutions to its myriad of challenges. The fact is that any broad representation
of the American health system is likely to be multi-colored, layered with
numerous contrasts, and ultimately any attempt to capture an overall image of
this system will be highly subjective, either framed by personal experiences, or
too often shaped by the collective power of anecdotes. 2 The portrait of health
delivery in the ranks of the insured public, while no longer a Norman Rockwell
image, will reflect moderate contentment; but to the forty-five million without
health insurance, the portrait of the American health system will be one drawn
in a stark manner.3 In the provider community the picture of the health system
will be a dark one, reflecting deep concerns, particularly on the part of physicians
as they cope with pressures to "do more with less," and experience an ongoing
erosion of professional autonomy.4 The most negative in the ranks of organized
medicine may depict the American health system in a manner akin to Edward
Munch's painting "The Scream," but even the more hopeful in the provider
world are likely to portray the health delivery system with a negative cast.' The
image of the system drawn by those in the world of health policy will be even
darker, more akin to a Jackson Pollock painting where continual and emerging
*
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1. See Richard Pirez-Pena, ForCinton'r Lead Sureon, Littk More Than a Day's Work, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2004, at A18.
2. See David A. Hyman, Patient Dumping and EMTALA: Past Irapeect/Future Shock, 8
HEALTH MATRIX 29, 33-44 (1998).
3. See e.g., Health Care ChoiceAct. Heaingon H.R 2355 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H.
Comm. on EnetW and Commerce, 109th Cong. 14-15 (2005) (statement of Merrill Matthews, Dir.,
Council for Affordable Health Insurance).
4. James L. Reinertsen, Zen and the Art of Phyjidan Autonomy Maintenance, 138 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 992, 992 (2003).
5. SeeJ. P. HODIN, EDVARD MUNCH (Thames & Hudson, photo reprint 1993) (1972).
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problems of cost, quality, and access are spread across the canvas of health care
appearing random, chaotic, and multi-layered, both incredibly difficult to
understand, and even more difficult to resolve.'
This essay stems from a Jackson Pollock-like vision of our health system, as
it is centered on the current crisis to engulf the canvas of American health care:
that of medical errors. Since the now landmark study of the Institute of
Medicine, To ErrisHuman, there has been a growing awareness of, and focus on,
hospital-based medical errors, both to understand the scope and nature of the
error problem, as well as to develop solutions, at the conceptual and operational
levels.' Although great progress is being made in hospital error prevention, the
issue continues to evolve, fueled by studies that reveal even more pervasive
problems in the area.8 The medical error crisis is part of an evolving picture; new
revelations of injury and death caused by preventable mistakes strike and run in
unpredictable ways across the canvas of health care.
While this piece is sparked by the evolving, somewhat chaotic image of
medical errors, it is not written to posit a specific solution to this profound
challenge, but, rather, focuses on how regulatory law can be made more effective
in addressing the various problems that fall within the context of medical errors.
This article is further removed from the front-line of medical error issues in that
it does not make a specific recommendation for a given regulatory solution, but,
rather considers how a new model of regulation might be better utilized as a tool
to address the medical error problem.
It is the premise of this essay that health regulation, in the context of
hospitals, is a matter of tradition, convenience, and political expediency, but is
rarely thought of as a distinct tool that, in and of itself, offers the potential for
facilitating solutions to given problems. This piece will make the argument that
the current regulatory approaches applied in the hospital world, and seen in
responses to medical errors, should be reevaluated, and that new models of
regulation should be explored as tools to enhance patient safety. Specifically, this
essay will examine broadly the types of regulations found in the hospital sector,
demonstrating the scope of this enterprise in the acute care setting, and
highlighting the various regulatory models that are being used in this sector.
Secondly, the paper will consider current and proposed regulatory initiatives,
focusing on the battles against hospital-based medical errors that have been
pursued at the federal and state levels, as well as in the private sector. The third
section of the paper will focus on how the regulatory landscape affecting
hospitals can be reshaped, and how a new approach to regulation could facilitate
6. See ELLEN G. LANDAUJACKSON POLLACK (1989).
7. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH CARE

SYSTEM 1 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
8. HEALTH GRADES, HEALTH GRADES QuAIATY STUDY: PATIENT SAFETY IN AMERICAN

HosPrrALs (2004), http://www.healthgrades.com/media/english/pdf/HG_-PaientSafetyStudy

_Final.pdf.
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better solutions to the hospital medical error crisis. A new model for dealing
with medical errors will be taken from a developing regulatory model.
Management-based regulation will be posited and two approaches to this model
will be considered: one building off of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Studies ("CMS") Quality Assessment and Performance Improvement ("QAPI")
program, and the other entailing adoption of a multi-industry quality model, ISO
9000. 9

II. THE LANDSCAPE OF HOSPITAL REGULATION
The acute care hospital has the ubiquitous distinction of being one of the
most heavily regulated entities in American society."0 Hospitals face a wide and
complex array of broad and narrow mandates emanating from all levels of
government, as well as from the private sector. Being the focal point of our
health delivery system, acute care facilities have been, and likely will continue to
be, subjected to increased regulatory pressures, reflecting complex and often
contradictory public goals." Expanding operational and financial complexities
have sparked growth in hospital regulation, along with governmental responses
to highly publicized health care problem areas like access, privacy of medical
information, charity care obligations, and medical errors.' 2 Issue-oriented
regulation is driven by politics and frequently results in the proliferation of
mandates that are layered onto existing
obligations, often uncoordinated with
3
established regulatory requirements.'

9. Conditions of Participation for Hospitals, 68 Fed. Reg. 3435 (an. 24,2003) (codified as
42 C.F.R. pt. 482).
10. AM. Hosp. ASS'N TASKFORCE ON REGULATORY RELIEF & REFORM, FINAL REPORT,

APP. E, Hospital Regulation (2002) [hereinafter AHA TASKFORCE].
11. The American Hospital Association Taskforce on Regulatory Relief and Reform is based
on the premise that hospitals are over regulated. In July 2004, the Department ofJustice and the

Federal Trade Commission issued a report on Competition and Health Care, see DEPT. OFJUSTICE,
DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ISSUE REPORT ON COMPETITION

AND HEALTH CARE (2004), hrtp://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2004/204711.htm.
The report focused on antitrust law but is reflective of the ongoing struggles in health care seen in
the hospital sector, between regulation and free market competition. In the process of preparing
the report, the FTC/DOJ held various hearings. In one of the hearings, Eugene Anthony Fay, the
Vice President of Government Affairs of Province Healthcare Company, testified on behalf of the
Federation of American Hospitals. Mr. Fay pointed out in his remarks the scope of federal and
state regulation confronted by hospitals. FEDERATION AND AMERICAN HOSPITALS, FTC/DOJ
HEARINGS ON HEALTH CARE AND COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY STATEMENT OF THE
FEDERATION OF AMERICAN HOSPITALS (2003), http://www.FTC.gov/ogc/healthcarehearings/

docs/030410Fay.pdf.
12. AHA TASKFORCE, .rupra note 10.

13. Id
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A. Scope of HospitalRegulation:A Simple Scheme
While there are many ways to characterize hospital regulations, the scope of
this enterprise can be demonstrated by means of a simple four fold classification:
core regulation, institution-wide regulation, targeted regulation, and private
regulation. Core regulation entails fundamental institution-wide mandates that
establish basic structure and operating processes which must be met for a facility
to function. The best example of core regulation is found in state hospital
licensure laws, which form a type of baseline that serves as a gateway into the
regulated activity. 4 The licensure baseline is not static, but is frequently altered
in response to changes in the enterprise and the needs of the public. Institutionwide regulations, while not entry regulations, have ramifications throughout the
entire facility. A prime example of an institution-wide mandate can be found in
the reimbursement area, in particular in Medicare, where participation in the
program requires meeting extensive Conditions of Participation requirements
that touch on all facets of a hospital operation.' 5 Some institution-wide
mandates, such as the relatively recent federal rules in the area of medical
privacy," may be less pervasive than Medicare requirements, but are felt,
nevertheless throughout the hospital. The third generic category of regulation,
targeted regulations, impacts a particular area of the hospital operation, whether
that be a given unit or service area, or a particular hospital function. In some
instances, targeted regulations may have broad impacts on the operation such as
the federal and state requirements to provide emergency medical services, and,
in other cases, regulations may be very narrow and focused on a very discrete
aspect of the operation.' 7 While technically private regulation, or voluntary
regulation, lacks the legal status of the other generic regulations noted, this type
of regulation is very significant in the hospital sector. In particular, the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations ("JCAHO"') has
developed industry standards which are widely subscribed to, as the voluntary
JCAHO requirements act as a mechanism for hospitals to qualify for Medicare
8
participation.'
14. See DEL. CODEANN. tit. 16, § 1005 (2003), HAW. REV. STAT. § 321-14.5 (2004), 210 ILL.
CoMP. STAT. ANN. 85/6 (West 2000), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.50 (West 1998).

15. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.1-482.66 (2004).
16. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.306-.534 (2005).
17. See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. §1395dd (2000) for
the requirements which have grown over the years. On the other hand, there are many narrower
requirements, often contained in licensure laws, such as the California directive that patients be
given written information about their rights upon admission, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
1262.6(a) (West 2002), and the New York law mandating a patient safety center, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2998 (McKinney 2000).
18. See Eleanor D. Kinney, PrivateAccreditationas a SubstituteforDirectGovernment Regulationin
PubicHealth InsurancePrograms:When isitApproprate?,57 LAW& CoNTEMP. PRoBS. 47, 52-55 (1994).
For information on JCAHO, seeJoint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
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Undoubtedly the scope of hospital regulations is broad, and will continue to
be a contentious area for the industry. Appreciating the breadth of hospital
regulation is significant in that it should give pause to government officials
designing strategies to meet ongoing and emerging problems through additional
regulation. The matter of regulation is not, however, merely a question of
volume, but ultimately a matter of effectiveness. The fact that there are
numerous regulations impacting hospitals, in and of itself, means little, and
certainly extensive regulation can be expected in fields that are highly complex
and imbued with strong public purpose. The difficulty with hospital regulation,
especially in the context of this article, is that the effectiveness of this extensive
body of mandates must be called into question in light of the profound problems
concerning hospital-based medical errors that have emerged and continue to
unfold.
B. Types of Regulation
Prior to the exploration of the relationship between medical errors and
hospital regulation, it is necessary to address not only the volume of hospital
regulation, but also the types of regulation being applied. The American
Hospital Association has identified seven regulatory models used in the hospital
arena: command and control regulation, public utility regulation, inspection,
reporting and disclosure, performance-based regulation, delegated regulation, and
market-based regulation.' 9 All of the models noted by the American Hospital
Association ("AHA") have been employed to varying degrees in the hospital
sector, both by accident and by design. Undoubtedly the most prevalent model
of hospital regulation is the command and control one, which emanates from the
rule-making process of administrative law.2" Both public health insurance
programs at the state and federal levels, as well as licensing agencies use a

command and control approach, and the largest volume of hospital regulation
dealing with the delivery of services, benefits and payment issues falls into this
category. More recently, the rule-making process has been used as a way to

implement new policies that are stymied in the legislative branch.2 The public
utility model, which typically is a mechanism to regulate rates and service areas,

has been used in a limited fashion in the hospital world, and can be seen as a
throwback to an era in which regulators felt costs could be controlled through

strong government oversight.'

In some jurisdictions, hospitals were subjected

(2005), http://www.jcaho.org/about+us/. The deemed status attached toJCAHO accreditation
can be found at 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (2001), 42 C.F.R. § 4885 (1993).
19. AHA TASKFORCE, supra note 10, at App. E.
20. Id. at 3-5.
21. Politics & Poliy Federal Regulations: NYT Examines Aggssive Use bj Bush, AM. HEALTH
LINE, Aug. 16, 2004.

22. AHA TASKFORCE, supra note 10, at 1-3.

HeinOnline -- 12 Widener L. Rev. 57 2005-2006

Widener Law Retiew

[Vol. 12:53

to rate-setting authorities and more commonly the creation and expansion of
hospital services has been controlled through state certificate-of-need
legislation.'

The use of inspection as a regulatory tool is common to hospitals and other
health facilities as a mechanism to control entry and to ensure ongoing
compliance with established or expanded mandates, generally through licensing
processes or private sector certification.24 In addition, inspection regulations
often contain provisions which allow regulatory follow-up based on consumer
complaints.' A regulatory model of particular relevance to the topic at hand,
medical errors, is the process of reporting and disclosure, which has its roots in
a consumer-oriented view of regulation that places strong faith in the use of data
to both identify and spark solutions to problems.' Reporting requirements
affecting hospitals have been prevalent for some time in a variety of contexts,
but in the emerging crisis of medical errors there is a widespread acceptance of
reporting as a mechanism to both identify and control error issues.2'
A very recent regulatory model in health care, being considered for use in the
hospital sector by the CMS, is the use of performance-based regulation.28
Performance-based regulation recognizes the achievement of established
outcomes as the key goal of regulation, and rewards entities that meet or exceed
targets. Under the auspices of CMS, demonstration projects are being developed
to reimburse hospitals at higher levels, based upon performance. 29 The so-called

pay-for-performance initiatives are being widely investigated by the public and
private sectors alike, as a mechanism to reward optimal performance and allow
regulators to focus on institutions whose performance falls below standards.' °
Delegation emerged as a mechanism to augment government oversight and, to
23. See ChristopherJ. Conover & Frank A. Sloan, Does Removing Cerflfcate-of-Need Regulations
Lead to a Surge in Health Cam Spending?,23 J. HEALTH POL POL'Y & L 455, 455 (1998).

24. See Illinois Hospital Licensing Act, 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/1-16 (West 2005).
25. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0161 (West 2002).
26. AHA TASKFORCE, supra note 10, at 4.
27. Barry R. Furrow, MedicalMistakes: Tiptoeing Toward Safqy, 3 Hous.J. HEALTH L & POL'Y
181, 203-06 (2003); Melissa Chiang, PromotingPatientSafey: Creating a Workabk Reporting System, 18
YALEJ. ON REG. 383, 383 (2001); Bryan A. Lang, The Adverse Event of UnaddressedMedical Error
Identifying and Fillingin the Hoks in the Health-CareandLegal Systems. 29J.L. MED. & ETHICS 346,357-

358 (2001).
28. See Premier, GroundbreakingPayforPerformance ProjectReports.Qualihy of Care Improvement at

ParticipatingHojpitals,
http://www.premieinc.com/al/newsroom/press-releases/05-may/pay-forperformance.jsp (last visited Feb. 11, 2006).
29. Id.
30. See L. Gregory Pawlson, Payfor Performance:Two CriticalSteps Needed to Achieve a Succesful
Program,AM.J. MANAGED CARE, Nov. 2004, at 4 (Supp. III); Price Waterhouse Coopers, Payfor
Performance'sSmallSteps ofProgress(2004),http://www.pwchealth.com/cgi-local /hcregister.cgi?link
=pdf/p4p.pdf. See also National Quality Forum, Payfor Peformance: Guiding Principles and Design

Strategies (2004).http://www.qualityforun.org/txNQFproject Summaryp4pl2-20-04.pdf.
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an extent, addresses the inability of government to protect the public in highly
technical areas. Delegated regulation, as previously noted, plays a very significant
role in the hospital world, as Medicare has transferred authority to a private
entity, JCAHO, to determine whether a given institution meets the necessary
requirements for participation in the federal health program.3 Finally, market
regulation is a type of de facto regulatory model in that government relies on the
hospital marketplace to provide health care in a competitive setting, and it is the
market that becomes the determinant of services and pricing.32 In the event
hospitals behave in an anticompetitive fashion, causing a breakdown in the
market, government, under the auspices of the antitrust laws, may chose to
intervene to correct abuses.
While application of a given regulatory model may be a deliberate choice, it
is not always clear whether such a choice is a matter of expediency, tradition or
is reflective of a carefully thought-out strategy. In the abstract it is difficult to
make value judgments about the appropriateness of a given regulatory model.
Divorced from ideological biases, the evaluation of the efficacy of a given
approach to regulation comes down to a matter of determining whether a
particular regulation meets its stated goals and reflects a compatibility with the
industry it is designed to control. It seems clear that no one model of regulation
is adequate for the hospital sector, but rather, complexities in this area require a
variety of approaches.33 It also seems clear that the current models of regulation
need to be continually evaluated and that emerging problems, such as medical
errors, should be seen as ones that continually force assessment of regulatory
models. The AHA Taskforce on Regulation has recommended that new models
of regulation be developed in light of its perceptions concerning the
shortcomings and burdens of established government approaches to regulating
the hospital sector. 3' The AHA cautioned that exploration of new regulatory
models for hospitals needs to be measured against fiscal realities, and even more
broadly, must be guided by a sense on the part of regulators as to whether
hospitals exist as a commodity or public good.3" Additionally, considering new
regulatory models, the underlying questions that must be confronted are whether
there will be a willingness on the part of regulator and regulatee to accept new
regulatory formats, and more broadly, whether a given format is a viable way of
enhancing the public's health.

31.
32.
33.
34.

42 C.F.R.. § 488.6 (2006).
AHA TASKFORCE, rupra note 10, at 4.
Id.at 4-5.
Id.at 5.

35. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 7, at Executive Summary.
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CONTEXT

Before positing an alternative regulatory model, it is first necessary to explore
the context within which that model would be applied, namely hospital-based
medical errors. In 1999 the Institute of Medicine ("GIOM' issued its now wellknown report, To Erris Human, in which it concluded that between 44,000 to
98,000 patients died in American hospitals as a result of preventable medical
errors.36 The IOM Report set the stage for a major initiative in American health
policy directed at preventing medical errors and enhancing patient safety.37 All
aspects of health care delivery, medical, surgical, and pharmaceutical, in inpatient
and ambulatory settings, have had to confront the growing awareness of medical
errors and implement changes to enhance patient safety. The epicenter of the
patient safety movement has been the acute care hospital, where an array of
38
clinical and operational efforts are ongoing to reduce medical errors.
Medical errors still pose a major challenge for acute care facilities; even with
changes in patient care processes, recent studies have indicated that problems in
this area may be more significant than what was revealed in the 1999 IOM
study. 39 A report on medical errors issued in 2004 by the consulting group
Health Grades estimated that the annual hospital patient deaths attributable to
errors were over 200,000. ° The Health Report study was based on sixteen
patient safety indicators developed by the U.S. Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality ("AHRQ"), and almost seventy-five percent of the estimated deaths
in the study resulted from the application of a new patient safety standard, "the
failure-to-rescue."41 Use of new safety indicators will likely expand the rates of
medical errors, as well as fuel the ongoing awareness of how widespread
problems in the area are. A noted health services researcher reported in 2003
that 100 patients will die daily in U.S. hospitals as a result of preventable errors,
and another patient safety expert lamented that even five years after the first
IOM Report, serious problems in patient safety still existed.42
Not all the news on the patient safety front is negative and the IOM report
and its progeny has served as a catalyst for a wide range of activities geared
36. IOM, supra note 7, at 1.
37. Furrow, supra note 27, at 203.
38. SeeJohn P. Marten, G. Landon Feazell & Michael W. Paddock, The HospitalBoardat Risk
and the Need to Restructure the Relationsbipwith the Medical Staff. Bylaws, Peer Rejiw and RelatedSolutions,
12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 179 (2003).
39. See HEALTH GRADES, supra note 8, at 6.

40. Id at 3.
41. See id at 4; John Morrissey, ErrorMeasureDraws Critics,MODERN HEALTHCARE, Aug. 2,
2004, at 12.
42. Donald M. Berwick, ErrorsToday andErrorsTomorrow, 348 NEW ENG.J. MED. 2570,2570
(2003); John Morrissey, PatientSafeo Proves Elusive: Five Years After the Pubcationofthe IOM ' To Err
is Human," There's Pknty of Aaitio on Patent Safe_*, but Progrss Is Another Matter, MODERN

HEALTHCARE, Nov. 1, 2004, at 6 (comments of Brent James).
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toward addressing various facets of the medical error issue.43 Responses to
medical error problems encompass activities to identify and assess medical
errors, establish new operational policies and standards, as well as the
development of governmental policies, which include the creation of various
legal mandates. There are numerous public and private initiatives, which are
focused on identifying and assessing medical errors and developing strategies to
prevent future problems. Typical operational responses at the hospital level
include developing better management information systems to address problems
in medication errors, and particular emphasis has been placed on infection
control, equipment errors, and even routine slip and fall issues." New IT
systems address long-standing problem areas such as tracking patients in the
emergency room and providing more timely results of diagnostic testing."
Hospitals are also cautioning patients about safety issues and stressing the need
for better communications between staff and patients."6 A not-for-profit
organization, the National Quality Forum ("NQF") endorsed twenty-seven
safety practices that should be used in applicable clinical settings to reduce the
risk of harm to patients."7 The NQF safety practices include use of eleven
recommendations for specific clinical care processes, seven recommendations
for information transfer and communications, and additionally incorporated
prior recommendations for use of physician computer order entry systems
("CPOE"), ICU physician staffing levels, as well as evidence-based referrals for
high risk procedures." A related private sector entity, the Leapfrog Group,
recently surveyed 1,000 hospitals concerning awareness, accountability, and
action in thirty safety areas, using the twenty-seven areas identified by the NQF."9
The Leapfrog survey indicated that hospitals are taking steps to improve patient
safety such as developing procedures to prevent wrong site surgery, or requiring
pharmacists to review medication orders before administration to patients. On
the other hand, the survey revealed failures in a number of areas, such as

43. See Morrisey, supra note 42.
44. For examples of patient safety approaches at one hospital see Central Maine Medical
Center, Patient Safety Quaky Management Report, http://www.cmmc.org/qualityreports/patient

_safety.html (last visited July 3, 2005).
45. SeeJohn Morrissey, Move Over HIPAA: PatientSafet Emerges as No. 1 Safeo Prios *for IT
Pros, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Feb. 17, 2003, at 14.
afe in the Hospital,http://www.ynhh.
46. See Yale-New Haven Hospital, PatientS y

org/choice/safety.html (last visited June 30, 2005) (encouraging communications between the
patient and healthcare professional as a fundamental aid to safety).
47. See THE NATIONAL QUALITY FORUM, SAFE PRACTICES FOR BETTER HEALTHCARE: A
NATIONAL QUALITY FORUM CONSENsus REPORT (2003), http://www.quaityforum.org/safe_

practices-report.html (access by clicking on various chapters).
48. Id.
49. THE LEAPFROG GROUP, THE LEAPFROG GROUP HosPITAL QUALITY AND SAFETY

SuRVEY (2004), http://eapfrog.medstat.com/pdf/faq.pdf.
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requiring workers to wash their hands with disinfectant before and after seeing
patients, or having procedures in place to prevent bed sores.'
A. FederalResponses
The federal regulatory response to the problem of medical errors has been
shaped by the recommendations of the Institute of Medicine that call for action
to address the problem generally, implementation of a system of public
accountability, development of a knowledge base regarding medical errors, and
promotion of a cultural change to reduce errors and improve patient safety."1
On the non-regulatory side, the AHRQ has taken the lead in coordinating
research and consultation in the area of medical errors.5 2 Under the auspices of
its Patient Safety Initiative, AHRQ has developed a long-term plan which
includes the following pinpointing threats to patient safety; identifying and
evaluating effective patient safety practices; teaching, disseminating, and
implementing effective patient safety practices; and engaging in ongoing
monitoring in the area."3 The AHRQ conducts much of its work in conjunction
with the private sector through grants and contracts. The Agency commissioned
a systematic exploration of patient safety practices, which entailed review of
seventy-nine practices, which has in turn served as a baseline for individual
hospital evaluations.-" Recently, AHRQ released a new tool to help hospitals and
health systems evaluate employee attitudes about patient safety in their facilities:
the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture.ss
In the regulatory context, the concern over medical errors and the goal of
enhancing patient safety is beginning to have direct and indirect impacts on
Medicare policies, as well as on policies of other agencies such as the Veteran's
Administration. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services issued a final
rule requiring hospitals to develop and maintain, as noted, what is referred to as
a Quality Assessment Performance and Improvement program ("QAPI'", which
is a part of the broader Medicare Conditions of Participation ("COP"). 6 QAPI
50. See LEAPFROG GRoup, supranote 49.

51. See IOM, supra note 7, at 3-4.
52. Seegeneral#, AHRQ, Medical Errors & Patient Safety, http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/
errorsix.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
53. AHRQ, AHRQs PatientSafety Initiatve:Builing Foundations,Redudng Risks,

http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/pscongrpt (last visited Nov 1, 2005).
54. AHRQ, Making Healthcare Sajre. A CriticalAnaysi of Patient Safeo Practices: Summay,

http://www.ahrq.gov/cinic/ptsafety/summary.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
55. The survey was designed in partnership with a hospital group, Premier Inc., the U.S.
Department of Defense, and the American Hospital Association, and is designed to measure
conditions that can lead to adverse events and patient harm. See AHRQ, HospitalSurvey on Patient
Safety Culture, http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/hospculture/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
56. Conditions of Participation for Hospitals: Quality Assessment and Performance
Improvement, 68 Fed. Reg. 3435 (Jan. 24, 2003) (codified 42 C.F.R. 482.21).
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is a minimum requirement that calls for hospitals to systematically examine their
quality and develop improvement projects on an ongoing basis.5" Central to this
regulatory regime are the goals of demonstrating both measurable progress in
quality through5 8improved health care outcomes and quantifiable reductions in
medical errors.
CMS casts the net of medical errors quite broadly, beyond medication and
surgical errors, and includes harm experienced while receiving health care such
as diagnostic errors, equipment failures, infection, blood transfusion-related
injuries, and deaths due to seclusion or restraint.5 9 Specifically, the QAPI
program entails four sets of requirements: first, the development of an ongoing,
hospital-wide program that measures reductions in medical errors; second, a
clearly defined policy on supporting data; third, a priority-setting process for
improvements which tracks and analyzes adverse patient events and implements
preventive actions; and fourth, the implementation of quality improvement
projects proportional to the scope and complexity of hospital services.' What
is particularly noteworthy about the QAPI requirements is that considerable
discretion is placed into the hands of the individual hospital to design a program
which fits its particular needs and, as such, reflects a concerted effort by the
regulators to move away from a heavily prescriptive approach to dealing with
hospital-based medical errors.
CMS in its final rule backed away from a proposed requirement that hospitals
assess their performances in twelve specific areas.6 ' Although flexible, the QAPI
regulations are not totally opened-ended in that compliance is to be measured by
state agency surveyors, who will evaluate the hospital-wide effectiveness of a
given program, so that institutions significantly out of compliance can be
terminated from the Medicare or Medicaid programs.62 While CMS pledges to
harmonize its quality evaluation measures with the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals, the JCAHO accreditation that allows entrance into
Medicare and Medicaid via deemed status will not63replace an independent state
agency evaluation of individual QAPI programs.
The medical error issue has also influenced Medicare policies in a more
indirect fashion. For example, the state-based Medicare Quality Improvement
Organization ("QIO") is involved directly in specific and related medical safety
efforts. In their current contract cycle, the QIOs have been charged specifically
with working with rural hospitals in developing an organizational culture of
57. Id
58. Id
59. Id at 3435-36.
60. Id at 3449.
61. Conditions of Participation for Hospitals: Quality Assessment and Performance
Improvement, 68 Fed. Reg. at 3438-39.
62. See id at 3442-43.
63. Id. at 3450.
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safety.6 More generally, the QIOs, as Medicare's quality assurance arms, have
been mandated to improve hospital performance in various clinical areas such
as surgical complications, colorectal cancer screening, and pressure ulcers. These
quality improvements have clear implications for error reduction and patient
safety.6 One current QIO target includes workforce turnover, a problem in
heath care institutions that has a very strong and well-established tie to patient
66
safety.
The QIOs are also mandated under the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act ("MMA") with collecting acute care

institutional performance data and providing hospitals with consultation in
meeting the new data reporting mandate."7 Prior to the 2003 Medicare
legislation, nearly 4,000 hospitals voluntarily reported performance data to CMS
in targeted areas.68 Under the MMA, most hospitals are required to submit
performance data to QIOs in ten target areas dealing with practices concerning
heart attacks, heart failure, and pneumonia.69 The submitted data will create a
national information repository that will allow for comparative analyses of
hospital performance in the respective areas. The results of the reporting
initiative will be available to consumers and should be a catalyst for improvement
in the affected areas, resulting in better performance and as such, prevention of
medical errors. Hospitals that fail to report quality measures in the specified
areas will receive a 0.4% lower Medicare payment update than reporting
entities.70 In a small way the new reporting mandate is CMS' initial venture into
pay-for-performance regulation. Although the reporting mandate only penalizes
the failure to comply, presumably the next possible phase of such regulation will
be to reward those acute care entities whose performance in the reported areas
exceeds certain thresholds.
Within other federal health programs, patient safety has become a priority area
as well. The Veterans Administration ("VA") has been very active in the patient
safety area. Even prior to the IOM Report, the VA developed the National
Center for Patient Safety, which coordinates system-wide efforts, and individual

64. OFFICE OF CLINICAL STANDARDS & QUALITY, QUALITY IMPROVEMENT GROUP,
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, PROPOSED SUMMARY OF DRAFT 8T
STATEMENT OF WORK 8 (2004).
65. Id. at 2.
66. Id.
67. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, Pub. L No. 108173, 109, 117 Stat. 2006 (2003).
68. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Near#AIlEgibk HospitalsAr Repotivgu" of
Care Data(2004), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?counter=1188.
69. Latham & Watkins LLP, CMS Issues Guideines on ReportingHospital.Quaky Datato Obtain
Payment Update Under Medicare PresctidonDrug Act (2004), http://www.Iw.com/resource/
Publications/ClientAlerts/dientAlert.asppid=936.
70. Id
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VA hospitals had launched their own specific safety measures.7 The VA has
developed several patient safety initiatives including both mandatory and
voluntary reporting systems, discrete patient safety improvement projects, 72
and
the creation of economic and punitive incentives to improve performance.

B. ReportingJCAHO and the States
In addition to agency activities, there has been an ongoing debate over the
enactment of a federal patient safety bill. In July of 2005, the U.S. Congress
enacted the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 ("P.L. 10941"), a reasonably detailed response to the problems of medical errors.73 Under
P.L. 109-41, physicians and other providers may voluntarily report confidential
and privileged patient safety information, referred to as patient safety work
product ("PSWP"), to federally certified.regional entities, such as patient safety
organizations ("PSO"s), which are run as either public or private entities. 74 The
PSOs will analyze the reported data and report out only nonidentifiable PSWP
data, which, in turn, may be linked to a network of national databases run by the
Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS"). s The identifiable
patient and provider data reported to PSOs cannot be used in civil, criminal, or
administrative proceedings, nor disclosed under the federal Freedom of
Information Act. However, source data, such as patient information found in
hospital records, will still be subject to the dictates of applicable state discovery
and collection laws.76
While this new law is an interesting step, reached after several years of
deadlock, it raises issues about whether hospitals will develop reporting practices
for quality data that will attempt to shield this information from discovery. From
a logistical standpoint, current institutional practices in quality data collection will
need to be -reevaluated, and separate collection practices may need to be
developed for federal reporting purposes. From a bureaucratic standpoint, it
remains to be seen how the new patient safety bureaucracy will be integrated
with other, more established DHHS and other federal program efforts in health
care quality and error prevention.
Moving outside the ambit of federal activities concerning medical errors, there
have been significant regulatory responses at the state level, as well as in the area
of private sector regulation. Although reactions to the epidemic in medical
71. See William B. Weeks &James P. Bagian, Developinga Culture ofSafety in the Veterans Health
Administration,6 EFFECTIVE CLINICAL PRAC. 270 (2000), availabk at

http://www.acponline.org/journals/ecp/novdecOO/weeks.pdf.
72. Id. at 272-74.
73. Patient Safety and Quality Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-41, 119 Stat. 424 (2005).
74. 119 Stat. at 424; 42 U.S.C. 299b-24 (West 2005).
75. 119 Stat. at 424; 42 U.S.C. 299b-23 (West 2005).
76. 119 Stat. at 424; 42 U.S.C. 299b-22 (West 2005).
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errors have been varied, a consistent response from both public and private
regulators has been the creation of reporting programs.7 To date, as noted,
federal legislation has only proposed a national reporting system, however, a
growing number of states and JCAHO have actually developed medical error
reporting programs which are designed not only to identify safety problems, but
also to foster analyses of problem areas and spark prevention strategies.7" Error
reporting is not a novel concept in the hospital world as state error reporting
laws in several jurisdictions have been in place for awhile. Though more
commonly internal to the hospital, reporting and analyses of serious incidents is
a well-established practice in the context of risk management.79
With the development in 1995 of its sentinel event program, JCAHO has
taken the lead in error reporting. JCAHO defines a sentinel event as an "event
[that] has resulted in an unanticipated death or major permanent loss of function,
not related to the natural course of the patient's illness or underlying
condition."' The occurrence of a sentinel event triggers whatJCAHO refers to
as a root cause analysis: a systematic investigation directed toward identifying the
most basic, or causal, factor or factors that underlie a variance in performance."'
A major part of the root cause analysis entails the institution's development of
policies and procedures that mitigate against the reoccurrence of the event in
question. Under the sentinel event policy, JCAHO encourages hospitals to
report to the accreditor sentinel events, root cause analysis processes, and
8 2
findings concerning adverse events which resulted in death or serious injury.
JCAHO sees the reporting system as an educational tool in that lessons learned
from serious incidents and responses can be shared with other health care
institutions. While the sentinel event program has been altered several times
since its inception in 1996, the process promoted by the private accrediting
agency has been very visible and reactions to it have framed the current debates
over key aspects of public medical error reporting initiatives.
77. See Chiang, supra note 27. There are a wide range of reporting requirements found in
state laws affecting hospitals. See e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE S 2226 (West 2005), WASH REV.
CODE § 70.41.200 (2005), 18 VT. STAT. ANN. § 9405b (West 2005), which reference hospital
reporting mandates in California, Washington, and Vermont, respectively. In addition, hospital risk
management entails internal reporting, mandated in state law. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-24
(2005), MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 19-319 (West 2005), FLA. STAT. § 395.0197(1) (West

2005).
78. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2226 (West 2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.41.200 (West
2005); 18 VT. STAT. ANN. tit.,
S 9405b (West 2005); RI. GEN LAWS § 23-17-24 (West 2005); MD.
CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 19-319 (West 2005); FLA. STAT. § 395.0197(1 1) (West 2005).
79. A. Michelle Kuhn, The Importance of Ear#Identification in the CaimsManagement Process,in
ESSENTIALS OF HOSPITAL RISK MANAGEMENT 43, 189-194 (Barbara J. Youngberg ed., 1990).
80. JCAHO, Sentinel Event Policy and Procedures, http://www.jcaho.org/accredited+
organizations/sentinel+event/se..pp.htm (last visited June 15, 2005).

81. Id.
82. Id
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One frequent point of debate is the question of whether or not medical error
reporting should be mandatory or voluntary. Critics ofJCAHO have pointed to
the low number of sentinel events that have been reported in contrast to the
increasingly larger projections about the number of medical errors, and these
critics have concluded that only a mandatory reporting of all serious incidents
can result in a helpful database on errors, and to a lesser extent act as a deterrent
against future errors.8 3 Those who are proponents of voluntary reporting argue
that mandatory reporting takes on a punitive cast and that rather than spark
openness and dialogue, obligatory reporting results in institutions hiding
problems.' 4 Clearly, the JCAHO position won favor in Congress in the new
Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, and undoubtedly Federal
politics were such that support for mandatory reporting may not be feasible.8 5
Another core issue raised by theJCAHO sentinel event program concerns the
nature of what should be reported. JCAHO requires only reporting of episodes
which resulted in death or serious injury, but critics point out that the reportable
universe is too narrow.'
Drawing on the experiences of aviation accident
reporting, it has been argued that so-called near misses should also be reported
in that emerging problem areas could be addressed prior to their actualization. 7
There has also been considerable controversy surrounding the ability ofJCAHO
to protect reported medical errors and root case analyses from legal discovery.8 8
The discoverability question raises a number of issues about the applicability and
scope of state peer review protections and has resulted in JCAHO developing
a four fold approach to reviewing error data, geared to the idiosyncrasies of law
in a given jurisdiction. 9

The Institute of Medicine also has been a strong proponent of medical error
reporting, but, unlike JCAHO, the IOM has called for a system of mandatory
reporting by hospitals and other health care institutions of adverse events that
lead to death or serious bodily harm, and in the case of near misses, the IOM
recommends that voluntary reporting occur." Additionally, the IOM argues that

reported information on errors should be protected from discovery when the
83. See Furrow, supra note 27, at 207-09.
84. Lang, supra note 27, at 346.
85. Todd Sloane, Not Mucb of a Cume; a HealthcarerQuai'y
Act That's Worse than No Law atAll,
MODERN HEALTHCARE, Aug. 8, 2005, at 21; see also Terry Hyland, MedicalEnvrs: New Law Calkd
GoodFirstStep, But Questions Remain on Detai, 14 BNA HEALTH LAW REPORTER 1041 (2005).
86. Furrow, supra note 27, at 203-06. See also Nancy LeGros & Jason D. Pinkall, The New
JCAHO PatientSafety Standardsand the Disdosureof UnanticipatedOutcomes, 35 J. HEALTH L. 189, 192

(2002).
87. See Paul Barach, The End ofthe Beginning:Lessons Leamedfrom the PatientSafe_* Movement, 24
J. LEGAL MED. 7,20-24 (2003).

88.

ButseeIOM, PATIENTSAFETY:ACHIEVINGANEWSTANDARD FOR CARE257-58

Aspden et al. eds., 2004).
89. JCAHO, spra note 80.
90. Barach, supra note 87.
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reported information is used by peer review entities.9 The position of the IOM
on reporting has been influential at the state level in that a growing number of
states have enacted laws that make reporting of certain medical errors to a
governmental authority mandatory, and, in turn, these state laws safeguard the
confidentiality of reported information, protecting this data from discovery or
use in legal proceedings.92
By the end of 2002, twenty states had enacted legislation requiring the
reporting of adverse events at hospitals as part of their state licensing
requirements.9 3 States have also faced the challenge of deciphering the types of
events that should be reported.94 At the urging of the IOM,states have relied on
the NQF Serious Reportable Events in Healthcare list as the basis for
determining what incidents should be reported. The NQF list of twenty-seven
egregious adverse medical events is seen by most states as a starting point, and
many state mandatory reporting systems are broader in nature, requiring the
reporting of events that present strong indicators of quality of care, as well as
"near misses."95 Minnesota is the first state to have adopted use of the entire list
of twenty-seven NQF adverse events measures for reporting purposes,
characterizing these incidents as "never events," ones that should never occur
under any circumstances. 96
Within fifteen days of the discovery of an adverse event covered in the
mandatory reporting list, Minnesota hospitals are required to report the event to
the Minnesota Department of Health ("MDH") and to conduct a root cause
analysis. 97 The MDH is mandated to publish a report on adverse hospital events
annually, together with recommendations for changes, and reported information
is to be made available to consumers." Specified adverse events are to be
reported by Minnesota hospitals via the web and these data are required to be
protected from discovery. In its first two years of operation the Minnesota
program is being totally funded by the private sector, but will eventually become
a state fiscal responsibility.99
91. Id at 25.
92. See state laws mentioned in supra note 77.
93. Jill Rosenthal & Maureen Booth, Dining Reportabk Adverse Events: A Guide for States

TrackingMedicalEtrors(2003), availableat http://www.premierinc.com/washington/trustees/docs/
nashp-reporting-adverse-events.pdf.
94. Id.
95. The National.aD'4 Forum is Setting Standardfor Ptimay Care, AM NEWS, Jan. 12, 2004.
96. Nat'l Ass'n of Health Data Orgs., MAN Mandates Reporting of MedicalErrorsUsing NQF
Measures(2003),http://www.nahdo.org/rojects.asp page=news&currentpg=12&optidon=display&
id=202.
97. Minnesota Hospital Association, Minnesota Impkments New Reporting System for Adverse
Health Events in Hospitalr,2-3 (2004), http://www.mnhospitals.org/inc/data/pdfs/
AHE._Background.pdf.
98. Nat'l Assn of Health Data Orgs., supra note 96.
99. Minn. Hosp. Ass'n, supra note 97, at 2, 5.
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Perhaps the most comprehensive medical error initiative at the state level is
occurring in Pennsylvania."° As part of a broad package of medical malpractice
reforms, Pennsylvania enacted Act 13 in 2003 that created the Patient Safety
Authority, a public entity charged with oversight of the medical error issue,
addressing the matter as a systemic problem, as opposed to a matter of individual
fault.'' The Pennsylvania law requires that hospitals, birthing centers, and
ambulatory surgery centers report serious events that cause death or compromise
patient safety, resulting in an unanticipated injury, to both the newly created
Patient Safety Authority and the state Department of Health.0 2 Incidents and
events that could have injured a patient, but did not, and also did not require
additional medical services, must be reported only to the Patient Safety
°3
Authority.
A key element in the Pennsylvania medical error legislation is the requirement
that reporting entities must give patients written notice of serious event
occurrences within seven days of their discovery."t 4 The law requires the
development of an internal safety bureaucracy within covered entities, entailing
the appointment of a patient safety officer, the creation of a working patient
safety committee, and the drafting of an institutional safety plan to be approved
by the state Department of Health.'0° The materials developed within the
institution prepared in compliance with the statute are confidential, and not
06
subject to discovery or admission in a civil or administrative action.
The Pennsylvania law is funded through a surcharge imposed on licensed beds
in the covered facilities. Implementation of the new law has proven complex as
the reported errors are to be gathered and analyzed by an outside vendor that
must be determined through a government contracting process. More
significantly, the new law must be coordinated with a 1997 provision under the
state Health Care Facilities Act which mandates reporting of a more limited
range of errors and further coordination must occur with the Pennsylvania
Department of State that regulates physicians. 7 The implementation of the
Pennsylvania law is still ongoing, and will be closely watched by other states, as

100. Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act, 40 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1303.101 (West 2004).
101. 40 CONS. STAT. ANN. S 1303.303 (West 2005) amended by 2005 Pa. Legis. Serv. (West), 40
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.304 (West 2002).
102. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 1303.313(a) (West 2004).

103. 4 1303.31300).
104. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.308(b) (West 2002).
105. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.307 (West 2002).
106. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.311 (West 2002).
107. Jane-Ellen Robinet, Slow StartforPaientSafetyAuthoriy, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS DIGEST, Apr.
2003, available at http://www.physiciansnews.com/cover/403.htm.
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well as by parties within the Commonwealth who are expecting the law to
produce measurable results.'
IV.

STEPPING BACK CATEGORIES AND ANALYSES

A. Models
The regulatory responses to the medical error crisis represent approaches that
to an extent fall into five of the seven models of regulation previously discussed,
namely, command and control, inspection, reporting and disclosure, delegated
regulation, and performance-based regulation. The respective categories overlap
in that various types of regulation are vetted through the administrative law
process, and as such, it seems safe to conclude that much of the governmental
response falls into the command and control approach, which is the dominant
regulatory model followed in the hospital sector. °9 Still, within that broad ambit
of command and control regulation, distinct approaches to controlling medical
errors are noticeable, in particular, reporting and disclosure. In fact, it could be
argued that at this early stage in dealing with medical errors, the mandate to
report information on errors is the dominant regulatory response. But as
medical error issues have sparked changes in licensure laws, the various related
inspection processes will be impacted as well.
In addition, delegated regulation is in evidence as the JCAHO sentinel event
reporting process impacted accredited facilities and shaped public policy in the
area, acting as a catalyst for government action. Particularly noteworthy is the
use of performance-based regulation within the federal quality arena as a new
mechanism to link payment with behavior. Also of interest is the fact that the
health insurance sector is beginning to consider withholding payment for care
when a medical error has occurred."' Even the two regulatory models, public
utility regulation and market regulation, may eventually be avenues for
controlling medical errors. It is conceivable that medical error and patient safety
could become elements considered in state certificate-of-need programs, and
over time changes in hospital behavior may have market implications as safety
records become significant issues in consumer choice.

108. Jane-Ellen Robinet, supra note 107.
109. AHA TASKFORCE, supranote 10, at 3-4.
110. Tracey Walker, Miniim'ngMedicalErrorsis on Healtbcare'sDocket,MANAGED HEALTHCARE
EXECUTIVE, Dec. 1, 2004, at 1, avai/abk at http://www.managedhealthcareexecutive.com/mhe/
article/ardcleDetail.jsp?id=136678.
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B. Regulatoy Rebonses: Are They Working?

At this juncture it is premature to assess whether the regulatory responses to
medical error issues and commensurate attempts to enhance patient safety are
succeeding. The nature and dimensions of the medical error crisis are still
unfolding, and so too, will the regulatory responses. Still a certain degree of
skepticism about the effects of current medical error regulation seems in order,
based generally upon what can be seen as shortcomings in hospital quality
regulation. If the concept of quality is thought of in very broad terms, it can be
argued that much of the regulation which impacts hospitals, previously reviewed
in a very general way, has a nexus to quality, whether it be structure-, process- or
outcomes-related. Not only have there been ongoing regulatory efforts to effect
quality of care, ranging from licensure to mandated peer review, but the common
law - through medical malpractice and institutional responses to liability, such as
risk management - can also be seen as a legal process that should have enhanced
quality. It is not unreasonable to conclude that the crisis in medical errors has
occurred in part because of a failure in regulation, as hospital-based errors are
occurring within this highly regulated environment.
On the other hand, some may argue that were it not for regulation, the
number of errors may actually be even greater, but arguments either pro or con
concerning the broad impacts of regulation on hospital quality, and more
specifically on medical errors, are ultimately all matters of speculation. The fact
is that it is impossible to gauge the effectiveness of quality regulation in a
conclusive fashion, but certainly questions about the effectiveness of past and
present regulatory strategies in the quality arena give credence to arguments for
exploring regulatory alternatives in this area.
Questions of the viability of hospital quality regulations mesh with broader
concerns over the excessive number of acute care regulations, the increasing
tendency to develop issue-related regulations, the lack of harmonization of state
and federal requirements, and the capacity of the field to absorb, respond to, and
finance new mandates.'11 The medical error issue is an ideal area for exploration
of new regulatory formats in that it covers an array of problems that manifest
themselves at varying levels from hospital to hospital, and the issue is
characterized by considerable uncertainties about the most appropriate manners
of response. The fact that the key regulatory initiative in the area is reporting
and disclosure demonstrates that there is still a great deal to learn about the
nature and scope of the medical error problem.
An even larger question about reporting is whether such mandates will
actually result in changes in processes and culture that are necessary if patient
safety is to be enhanced. Part of the current regulatory difficulty at the federal
level in responding to medical errors stems from the fact that new patient safety
measures are incorporated within this area within the traditional context of
111. AHA TAsKFORCE, supra note 10.

HeinOnline -- 12 Widener L. Rev. 71 2005-2006

Widener Law Review

[Vol. 12:53

established quality assurance programs. Unquestionably, the medical error issue
is a type of quality problem, but patient safety measures, such as assuring that a
wrong limb is not amputated or the correct medication is given, are hardly
sophisticated matters comparable to those which characterize AHRQ clinical
research activities. Patient safety may be more compatible with industrial
engineering, human resource management, and staff education than with
complex clinical quality considerations. It is certainly reasonable to argue that
patient safety does not necessarily equate with optimal quality of care, as the fact
that a patient was not injured does not necessarily mean that the care provided
was appropriate. Unquestionably, preventing medical errors and ensuring patient
safety are clearly linked to quality, but they are areas that lie at the baseline of
quality and may be better addressed outside the framework of traditional clinical
improvement processes.
V. NEW GOVERNANCE - NEW MODELS
The recognition that regulation in the hospital sector may not be optimal, and
that pursuing solutions to the medical error crisis through current regulatory
pathways could falter, only leads to the greater challenge of determining what
type of regulatory strategies might be more appropriate to enhance patient safety.
In the broader area of regulation generally, there has been a growing movement
in legal theory to develop alternative regulatory models." 2 The search for
alternative avenues of regulation is sparked by a desire to interject more flexibility
into the regulatory process, allow greater input into regulations from the microlevel, and devise regulatory schemes that are capable of targeting regulatory
requirements to the level of problems encountered in a given entity. In a broad
sense, the goal of legal theorists positing new models of regulation is to
formulate a strategy for regulation that lies between the poles of the traditional
command and control regulatory format characterized by administrative rule
making, and the relinquishment of regulation to free market controls. A number
of novel and distinct regulatory strategies are emerging in search of a viable
middle ground, and many of these alternatives share commonalities of being
more participatory, open-ended, flexible, and adaptive to change." 3
From a theoretical standpoint, new middle ground regulatory approaches fall
into the generic classification of new governance.114 A widely studied, and
somewhat older alternative model in the area of new governance, is responsive
regulation in which a regulated party negotiates enforceable conditions of
regulation with the regulator, a hierarchy of sanctions are developed to match
112. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal The FallofRegulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342, 343 (2004).
113. Id
114. Id. at 344. See also Bradley C. Karkkainen, 'New Governance" in Legal Thought and in the
World Some Sp'ting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REv. 471,473-75 (2004).
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degrees of infringements, and a role for the public in regulatory decision-making
and monitoring is created. 1 5s In the context of medical errors, one emerging
regulatory model, known as management-based regulation, appears to provide
a fruitful alternative, and seems somewhat
compatible with current regulatory
16
directions being followed by CMS.1
A. Management-BasedRegulation
Management-based regulation is a mechanism that directs regulated entities
to engage in planning processes that are self determined to meet a particular
public goal, such as enhancement of patient safety." 7 Commentators Coglianese
and Lazer, who have written extensively on management-based regulation,
distinguish this form of regulation from rules that mandate certain technologies
or behaviors, so-called technology-based regulation, as well as from regulations
which require certain outcomes be performed or avoided, so-called performancebased regulation." 8 Unlike technology-based regulation, which intervenes at the
action stage of organizational behavior, and performance-based regulation that
concerns outputs, management-based regulation is focused on planning." 9 The
rationale underlying regulatory intervention at the planning stage is that sound
planning will spark good internal management, resulting in achievement of public
goals. The planning process is heavily dependent on information, and the nature
and type of information used in planning may be largely a matter of selfdetermination on the part of the regulated. Uses of information in managementbased regulation for planning purposes are distinguished from the information
mandates of collection and disclosure that are so prevalent in medical error
regulation, and would better be classified as technology or process regulation.
Unlike other forms of new governance, management-based regulation is not
just a theoretical construct, but has actually been used in a number of areas such
as safety regulation in the food and occupational arenas, as well as in pollution
prevention, all enterprises that are characterized by extensive technical
considerations. 2 ' In the food safety field, the USDA and the FDA have adopted
a globally accepted regulatory strategy, Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Point ("HACCP"), that requires food producers to identify hazards, assess risks
of hazards, identify the best methods for dealing with hazards, and make

115. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1995).
116. Conditions of Participation for Hospitals, 68 Fed. Reg. at 3435.
117. Cary Coglianese &David Lazer, Management-BasedRegulation:PrescribingPrivateManagement
to Achieve Pubic Goah, 37 L. & Soc'Y REV. 691, 694 (2003).
118. Id.at 701-02.

119. Seeid at 694.
120. Id. at 702.
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necessary changes to avoid future problems.'' Non-binding guidelines on how
to create an HACCP plan have been developed by regulators and plan
compliance is monitored, but food producers have considerable leeway in
devising their plans and managing risks.' 22
As the brief example of food safety indicates, management-based regulation
is more flexible than a command and control approach, but it is not totally openended. The management-based regulatory model can be developed in a number
of ways depending upon the goals of regulators and the likelihood of industry
compliance. Clearly a major issue for any regulator in pursuing a regulatory
strategy is cost. It may seem that self-generated approaches to problems through
management-based regulation may be cheaper than mandated ones, but such a
conclusion may not be warranted as considerable internal efforts need to be
made in a management-based regulation scheme that could be quite costly."2 In
addition, if management-based regulation is added onto current regulatory
structures, such an addition may actually increase costs.
There is also a determination that needs to be made as to whether all the
actors in a given field have adequate capabilities to devise and implement an
effective, internally generated plan. Within the context of management-based
regulation, questions need to be addressed about how directive government
authorities should be.'24 For example, should regulators merely require that the

regulated entity engage in planning in a given area, without providing directions
about the elements of the required plan, or should planning be a more prescribed
process, with planning elements specified by the regulator, and plan approvals
required? Beyond the plan itself, there needs to be consideration about how
much monitoring government should engage in over plan implementation, and
whether record keeping, inspections and third-party audits will be required. 2 '
Management-based regulation appears to be most viable in areas that are
highly technical and where solutions to problems may be unique to individual
circumstances. It would seem that management-based regulation fits well into
the patient safety area, in that insuring safety and preventing medical errors
represents a wide range of complex clinical and operational matters, and
problems encountered from hospital to hospital may vary significantly. The fact
that public and private entities are concentrating safety prevention on a number
of discrete priority areas does not negate the fact that the area is broad,
multifaceted, and variable.

121. FDA Backgrounder, HACCP: A State-of-the-Ad Approach to Food Safety (2001),
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-Ird/bghaccp.html.
122. FDA Backgrounder, supra note 121.
123. Conditions of Participation for Hospitals, 68 Fed. Reg. at 3435 (see Designing
Management-Based Regulation).
124. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 117.
125. Id at 718-19.
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1. The CMS QAPI as a Model
If management-based regulation is to be considered in the medical errors
context, a sound jumping off point would be the CMS QAPI program previously
discussed.'2' In fact the QAPI program, as it is currently constituted, can be
characterized as a type of management-based regulation. The regulatory
structure of QAPI is a planning model that allows for considerable discretion on
the part of the hospital to design a quality assessment and performance program
that demonstrates improvements in healthcare outcomes and reduction of errors.
The regulation is designed to allow hospitals the flexibility to structure programs
that are tailored to their individual situations. The regulations do not require
prior approval of hospital QAPI programs, but the process is not open-ended
as there is considerable specificity provided in the regulations about the overall
framework of these programs. 127 Hospital programs must be institution-wide,
be measurable (in reference to both clinical outcomes and error reduction), use
specified data elements, include ongoing corrective action measures, and include
the development of specific projects to reduce errors in discrete areas. The
QAPI regulations place responsibility for program operations on hospital
leadership (board, medical staff), and individual institution programs must be
evaluated as part of the CMS institutional survey process to determine
compliance; failure in
the area could lead to termination from the Medicare and
' 28
Medicaid programs.
While QAPI represents a major departure from the command and control
model traditionally followed by CMS, it is clearly a model of management-based
regulation which reflects considerable government involvement at the planning
and implementation phase. CMS is now working toward the development of
standardized performance and data collection that would become part of the
QAPI program, further underscoring the fact that the regulator will continue to
be actively engaged in shaping the framework of this program. 129 It may be
unreasonable to expect that CMS would delegate the reduction of medical errors
to the hospital community without considerable oversight on their part, not only
due to concern over the impacts of change in regulatory policy, but also because
there is considerable expectation that the agency will deal effectively with this
major policy challenge. The movement toward regulatory flexibility represented
by QAPI must also be viewed cautiously for if real results do not occur within
the context of the program, it is not unreasonable to expect that the agency will
revert back to the command and control approach.

126.
127.
128.
129.

1M, supra note 7.
Id.
Id.; Conditions for Participation for Hospitals, 68 Fed. Reg. at 3435, 3443, 3446.
Conditions of Participation for Hospitals, 68 Fed. Reg. at 3444.
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2. ISO 9000: An Emerging Alternative
At the risk of pushing an idea too far, it seems appropriate to consider
whether any other management-based regulatory models might be found to deal
with medical error issues beyond QAPI. The desire to identify another
management-based regulatory model to enhance patient safety is prompted not
only by a desire to expand the range of possible applications of this regulatory
approach, but by the limitations of the QAPI program. Experts on medical error
have reached consensus that prevention of errors will require not just a response
to individual problems but rather the development of systems and processes that
are responsive to patient safety, and are inclusive of all operational aspects of an
institution.'"3 QAPI may ultimately lead to the creation of error prevention
systems within hospitals, but the regulation as it is now constituted is very
oriented toward identifying and correcting particular, self-selected problem areas.
Within the context of management-based regulation, a more systems-oriented
model can be found in an established quality management system, the ISO 9000
series standards 3 The International Organization for Standardization that
created the ISO 9000 series is an internationally recognized entity that has
overseen the development of quality standards that touch on all activities in an
organization that determine quality policies, objectives and responsibilities,
related planning, controls, and specific approaches to quality assurance.' 32 The
main purpose of these standards is to establish a consistent and high level of
quality practices that require organizations to implement quality systems-formal
organizational policies, processes, and procedures that meet the needs of the
entity's customers (patients).'33 ISO 9000 is, in fact, a common reference for a
group of generic quality standards (ISO 9000 through ISO 9004) that are both
advisory and procedural in nature."3 When an organization demonstrates
compliance with ISO standards to a third-party review entity (the registrar), the
organization's quality system, not the entire entity, is registered as being

130. Rene Amalberti et al., Five System Barriersto Achieving UltrasafeHealth Care, 142 ANNALS
OF INTERNAL MED. 756 (2005).
131. Michael G. Crago, Patient Safety, Six Sigma & ISO 9000 _Quaky Management, QUALITY
DIGEST, Nov. 2000, availabk at http://www.quaitydigest.com/novOO/html/paient.html; Laura
D. Prioli, ISO 9000 Certifcationfor Health Care Organizations,http://www.ics.sgsna.com/services/
Healthcare.htm (last visited July 7,2005); Barry K. Hall & Stephen H. Trexler, ISO 9000 White Paper
'7ncreasingProfltabi'y,.Qualiyand Compliance with ISO 9000" http://www.rosternetwork.com/bna/
iso_9000_whitepaper.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
132. See Crago,supra note 131.
133. Medical Device Safety Reports, ISO 9000 Seies Standards: What HealthcareFad&'esNeed
to Know, http://www.mdsr.ecri.org/summary/detail.aspx?docid=8278 (last visited Nov. 5,2005).
134. Myra Ellen Edelstein, How ISO 9000 StandardComud Improve.Qua' y, MANAGED CARE
MAGAZINE, Nov. 1998, availabk at

http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/9811/9811 /iso.html#how.
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compliant. 3 The standards, designed originally for manufacturing, have been
applied recently to service sectors, including health care.
The concept of quality manifest in ISO 9000 focuses on four broad areas:
generating outputs that meet customer (patient) specifications, creating quality
systems which are consistently implemented and verifiable, ongoing monitoring
of quality systems, and efforts directed toward continuous quality
improvement.'3 6 Within the ISO 9000 series, the ISO 9001:2000 standard relates
most directly to health care quality. The 9001:2000 quality standard rests on
eight well-accepted quality management principles: customer focus, leadership,
involvement of all personnel, process approach, systems approach to
management, continual improvement, factual approach to decision making, and
positive supplier relationships.'37 The ISO 9000 process requires that all systems
and procedures be documented for every organizational activity that has a direct
or indirect impact on quality in areas affecting costs, unit performance, and
customer satisfaction. For purposes of this system, hospital activities can be
broken down into clinical services, functional departments, and administration,
and in each of these areas, ISO 9000 standards require creation of quality
measures which cover both internal process and outcome matters, as well as
Within each of a
external considerations such as regulatory compliance."
hospital's documented operational areas touching on patients, safety measures
would clearly be incorporated as essential elements of quality, not only as a
matter of enhancing clinical excellence, but more basically, as a mandate to
protect patients from any type of harm. ISO 9000 processes involve clinical and
support staff and administration in planning and implementation. Success in
making quality systems work within a given hospital requires knowledge on the
part of all personnel of developed policies and procedures, particularly in areas
such as patient safety.
The ISO 9000 standards are widely used by hospitals around the world, but
are only now being considered in the United States. In part, consideration of
adopting ISO 9000 can be seen as a reaction against what is perceived as an
overly prescriptive JCAHO accreditation process, but it is also seen as a
mechanism of private regulation that allows an entity to structure its own
approaches to quality and safety, integrating various quality related processes into
a single framework.'39 While ISO allows for autonomy in program design and
135. Medical Device Safety Reports, supra note 133.

136. See Lucid International, Basic ISO 9000 Information,
http://www.iso9000commerce.com/isojntro.htm (last visited July 7, 2005). See a/so Hall &
Trexlor, supra note 131.
137. Seegenera/4, BRYCE E. CARSON, ISO 9001-2000, A NEW PARADIGM FOR HEALTHCARE
(2004); see also Praxiom, ISO 9001 2000 Translated Into Plain English, http://www.praxiom.com/
iso-9001.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2005).
138. Medical Device Safety Reports, supra note 133.
139. Frank Diamond, Proponents Say ISO 9000 Standardsare a Less Presrdptive, Ponderous and
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implementation, an organization must meet broad requirements applicable to its
industry. For example, in the hospital area, an institution's failure to practice
appropriate sterilization techniques or infection control would constitute
nonconformance with ISO standards."'t To meet program requirements, a
hospital must consider what the ISO standards require and correlate the
elements of that standard with the particular service in question. In assessing
given approaches to quality, the ISO process requires analyses of how adopted
hospital processes enhance overall quality, meet patient needs, and reflect stateof-the-art practices. 41 Entities that use the ISO 9000 process can reference
health care industry guidelines that deal with quality improvement and planning,
specifically the ISO 9001:2000 standard previously noted. An entity can have its
compliance with ISO 9000 certified by a registration process conducted by one
of fifty-two recognized certification organizations every three years, with ongoing
surveillance of parts of the organization's quality system as frequently as every
six months. 142
Beyond theoretical constructs, ISO 9000 is perhaps the most open-ended,
applied form of management-based regulation that currently can be referenced
in the hospital context. It clearly possesses significant flexibility in that it is
structured through a process that is self-determined by a hospital, and the
guidance in creating and implementing the process is largely advisory. As noted,
however, ISO 9000 compliance is evaluated externally, and there are generic
standards that can be referenced as guide points for implementation and
assessment. The advantage of using ISO 9000 beyond flexibility and institutional
self-direction appears to lie in the fact that this quality process is system-oriented
and offers an opportunity to more easily link patient safety to all areas of the
hospital, beyond just clinical considerations. Proponents of the current
licensure/accreditation system for hospitals argue that ISO 9000 can only be
applied to those parts of a hospital that function in a quasi-industrial, processtype mode, and that the standards in this evaluation system are too general,
lacking the comprehensiveness and specificity to improve quality found in the
JCAHO standards. 143 Interestingly enough, however, ISO 9000 has been
promoted in a proposed piece of Pennsylvania legislation as a type of hospital
risk management program the application of which is tied to reduced medical
malpractice premiums.'"
Cost# Way to Renew Hospita. But Are Thby Tru# Applicable to Health Care? The Mountain Named
JCAHO Meets the Tremor Calkd ISO, MANAGED CARE, Nov. 1998, availabk at

http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/9811/9811.iso.hTl; see Hall & Trexler supranote 131.
140. Medical Device Safety Reports, supra note 133.
141. For a basic discussion of the ISO certification process, see Simply Quality, Frequently
Asked Questions About ISO 9000, http://www.isoeasy.org/faql0.htm (last visited June 12,2005).
142. Medical Device Safety Reports, supra note 133.
143. See H.B. 845,2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003).
144. See H.R. 162, 183d Gen. Assern., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1999) (resolution commending a
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3. Reflections on Management-Based Regulation
Some form of management-based regulation may offer regulators an attractive
alternative to existing regulatory models in the hospital area generally. In the
case of medical errors, management-based regulation provides a flexibility that
could lead to more creative approaches to both identifying and correcting
problems. Management-based regulation seems particularly attractive in the
patient safety area in that this regulatory model is well suited to an area
characterized by technicalities, uncertainties as to cause and response, and
disparities across the field in both the type and extent of problems. At most,
management-based regulation may be a long term vehicle to spark a regulatory
make-over of the hospital field, and at the least, it would be an experiment in
regulation that could more effectively engage the regulated in a way that is not
merely focused on compliance.
Undoubtedly, the movement to management-based regulation would be a
major change in the manner in which regulators deal with hospitals, and while
the CMS QAPI program signifies a willingness on the part of a regulator to
adopt a more flexible regulatory scheme, that program must be viewed cautiously
as it is both new and possibly transitional. The broader history of hospital
regulation depicts a story of considerable rigidity in approaches to controlling
hospitals, so it seems reasonable to conclude that adoption of new models will
be challenging and gradual. There is also a reality that must be confronted that
merely using a new model will not, in and of itself, be effective unless certain
surrounding factors are taken into account in the application of that model.
For management-based regulation to be effective, at least four factors must
be considered. First, while this model offers considerable flexibility on the part
of the regulated, there still needs to be certain policy guidance provided by the
regulator. In the medical error context, objectives need to be spelled out beyond
error prevention and enhancement of patient safety. While regulators may not
need to detail a list of medical errors that must be addressed, some direction
about the overall structure of a program of error prevention is necessary to
ensure that regulatory compliance is meaningful. Secondly, there needs to be a
major change in the role of the regulator. Rather than focusing on enforcement
and compliance, regulators will need to become more collaborative and
consultative in their posture to the regulated. In a sense, changing the regulatory
role to one of acting as a consultant to the field will require more hands-on
involvement in facility operations and a greater knowledge of the patient safety
area than is required in an enforcement role. The flexibility present in
management-based regulation will afford regulators the ability to recommend a
range of responses that would not be possible in a traditional regulatory scheme.
Thirdly, hospitals must be willing to support a new approach to regulation that
Pennsylvania school district on its achievement of ISO 9000 certification).
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will engage the institution in a problem-solving mode, which is much different
from a posture reactive to regulations that stresses doing only what is required
to comply with a mandate. It will only be through considerable internal efforts

that management-based regulation will succeed in that processes like ISO 9000
require institution-wide engagement, from planning to implementation. For
hospitals to effectively pursue creative patient safety measures, there needs to be
a certain level of trust developed on their part toward regulators that alternative
approaches to dealing with medical errors will be fairly evaluated and allowed to
evolve. Finally, the movement toward management-based regulation in the
patient safety area should not be seen as an all-or-nothing proposition. A
movement toward a more flexible regulatory model may be accompanied with
other traditional approaches to the problem of medical errors, such as
identification and reporting. Regulators will need to balance diverse regulatory
approaches to insure that new models are allowed to operate along side of
traditional regulation and that new approaches are given adequate time to prove
their value. They must also be tolerant of compliance efforts that are not
uniform.
VI. CONCLUSION

Comparing the current crisis in medical errors to a Jackson Pollack painting
appears apt as the picture we are currently seeing is confusing, chaotic, and
subject to an array of interpretations. The medical error issue has taken on a
longer life than may have been predicted even after the first IOM report, as the
scope of this issue continues to evolve and broaden. It is likely that the medical
error crisis, and the related attempts to protect patient safety, will prompt a wide
array of diverse clinical and operational responses, some uniform in character
and others highly anecdotal. The regulatory responses to medical errors are also
evolving, but caution must be exercised here as new regulations appear to be
framed within the context of traditional models that have been identified as
increasingly problematic in the hospital context. While it may be premature to
judge particular regulatory efforts in the medical error context, it seems that the
primary response of mandated reporting is a very preliminary reaction that
undoubtedly will help us to understand the dimensions of the issue. Whether
such an understanding will lead to tangible improvements, however, is still an
open question. If medical errors are to be reduced and patient safety enhanced,
consensus is emerging that hospital-based systems, clinical and operational, must
be developed and/or improved. It would appear then, that regulation in the area
should be sparked by a dual imperative. On the one hand, the emerging and
evolving medical error arena should be viewed as an opportunity for regulators
to break new ground and create a regulatory scheme that allows the regulated the
opportunity to exercise meaningful input in framing and solving the problem and
in turn, place the regulatory agency into more of a collaborative and consultative
role. On the other hand, the regulatory solution must be sensitive to the need
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not only to deal with individual patient safety problems, but also to allow
individual hospitals to create a platform for the development of viable system
approaches to the issue generally. It appears that the regulatory model of
management-based regulation which comes from the broader area of new
governance presents a viable alternative for government to confront medical
errors, whether that model is framed along the lines of the CMS QAPI program
or the generic ISO 9000 quality model. What is proposed in this piece is
undoubtedly a major change in the nature of hospital regulation that will be
difficult for regulator and regulatee alike, but regulatory policies must always be
subservient to the public good and the formats in which such policies are
incorporated are only tools to effectuate safety goals, not ends in and of
themselves.
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